The following two important developments have taken place since 1992 as regards the diversion of the Acheloos River. 

1) The Decision of the Council of State, which was taken after the appeal lodged by five ecological organizations and the Urban Councils of Messolongi and Agrinion. This decision characterized the continuation of the diversion works as illegal, since there was no trustworthy overall study of the environmental implications, and at the same time called for an immediate cessation of the works.

2) The publishing of an overall study of the environmental implications on the part of the Ministry of the Environment and Public Works, which, conforming to the decision of the Council of State, had proceeded with the signing of a contract with various specialised consultants in November 1994. This "Study" was finished in a record time of only 100 days, and was published in August of 1995, a period when Greece lies dormant because of the summer holidays.

In this study, instead of an end to the circle of improvisation, a new era of untrustworthiness begins as to the methods of the collection, consideration and presentation of such a study, and for such an important project. The consultants themselves refer to the time restrictions they were working under as follows. Appendix A! paragraph 5.1.1. "The purpose of this chapter is to estimate with as great as possible accuracy (taking into mind the time restrictions for the completion of the study) the natural and exploitable hydrodynamic power of the catchment areas which are in any way connected to or correlate with the diversion of the Acheloos ...... Nature, the great geographical area, and the time restrictions for the study allowed neither the extensive collection, processing and exploitation of the primary hydrological data, nor the use of the most developed methods of hydrology technology for the estimation of the hydrodynamic power under consideration." These observations are softened further down by the comment ".... these weaknesses did not in any way discredit the trustworthiness of this study."

Thus the decision of the Ministry to complete an overall Study of Environmental Implications (SEI) of the diversion of the Acheloos towards Thessaly was not, unfortunately, the result of sensitivity on its part for the need of a serious study of this major scheme, but a result of the legal hindrance placed by the decision of the Council of State. The Ministry was dragged to the composition of an overall study solely for the purpose of facing the legal problem.

Thus we had as a result the composition of another SEI like all the others, the only purpose of which is the excuse it offers the state of there being an overall study.

The great surprise of this study is that with the data it provides, the clerks of the Ministry who processed the data of the consultants arrived arbitrarily at exactly the opposite results, that is support for the diversion, that a more circumspect study of the same data would arrive at, using common sense and a comparison of the data.

In this study of ours, we will try to present the new adverse data and the main points of untrustworthiness of the new SEI. We shall make no reference here to the environmental implications as these are already well-known, have often occupied us in the past, and are self-evident for any diversion, especially that of the Acheloos.

The great surprise of this study is that with the data it provides, the clerks of the Ministry who processed the data of the consultants arrived arbitrarily at exactly the opposite results, that is support for the diversion, that a more circumspect study of the same data would arrive at, using common sense and a comparison of the data.

In this study of ours, we will try to present the new adverse data and the main points of untrustworthiness of the new SEI. We shall make no reference here to the environmental implications as these are already well-known, have often occupied us in the past, and are self-evident for any diversion, especially that of the Acheloos.
 

I) It is said that Thessaly has been slowly withering away for forty years because of a lack of water for irrigating purposes, although in the last ten years the irrigated areas and the number of artisan wells has doubled.

The authors of the new overall SEI, as in many previous cases, are always talking about the destruction of the plain of Thessaly through the lack of irrigation water, something which has been going on drearily for the last forty years. However the data of the study itself give a completely different picture of the reality in Thessaly. That is, we see in these data a great increase in the number of drillings undertaken by the Organization for the Exploitation of Underground Water in Thessaly (OEUWT) during the five-year period 1974-78, in the order of 545 drillings, that is 1816%, and in the eight years from 1978-85, by 490 drillings, that is 85%. We also see a similar increase in private drillings.

During the same period we have not only no decrease of irrigated farm- land in Thessaly, but to the contrary an increase, and indeed an increase in the total of cultivated land as against of grazing land. In detail, in the seven-year period 1977-83 we had an increase of irrigated land by 45,000 hectares, an increase of 43% approximately, while in the four-year period 1991-94 we not only had an increase of irrigated land by 75,000 hectares, an increase of 45% approximately, but also an increase in the total cultivated land as against grazing land of 30,000 hectares, that is to say 9% (see tables 1, 2 and 3)  

With this data it is natural that one should query where the experts and the supporters of the diversion see the tremendous problems which Thessaly is supposed to be facing through a lack of water for irrigation. There is no doubt that this incalculable and unprogrammed increase in irrigation will cause problems in the not too distant future. The state on the other hand not only does not interfere to prevent such an adverse development, but indeed seems to do everything possible to encourage it.

It is necessary to point out that the new SEI does not include the diversion in a general national plan of water use, as law 1739/87 states, but deals with this whole tremendous project in the most random way. This improvisation with which the whole work is faced can be proved from the fact that despite the final starting of the work in 1984, exactly that year 1984-5 is when the hydrological data finish. This is explicitly stated in the study itself, paragraph 5.3.4. "all the hydrological samples for Thessaly at the most reach the hydrological year 1984-5, since there is no processed hydrological information for more recent years. This creates major problems in the estimations of the present study since the recent dry period of 1986-94 is in no way covered by the samples...."  
 

II) The real needs of Thessaly are covered or can be covered by the existing water resources of the Peneios, Carla and Drillings.

This conclusion is not random, but is the product of the serious study conducted by the company Electrowatt in 1966 for the then Ministry of the Environment and Public Works. Electrowatt had then suggested a series of projects on the tributaries of the Peneios, but also on the river itself that would cover the greater part of the demand for irrigation in Thessaly. This indeed is attainable, and appears from the fact that Thessaly receives 9 billion cubic metres of water yearly from rainfall, and that the Peneios itself as can be seen from the study Morgan-Grenfell in 1988 (see 4) pours around 3 billion cubic metres of water each year into the Thermaic Gulf.

Within the framework of this suggestion the following have already been realised:

1) The dam of Smokovo has been completed. Over 26,000 hectares will be irrigated from this dam, Appendix B, paragraph 2.2. "The dam of Smokovo, which is purely for irrigation purposes, is estimated to receive in the order of 114 X 106 cubic metres of water, with which the irrigation of approximately 23,200 hectares of cultivable land will be attained. It is noted that the extension of the irrigation to a section of the west side of the project in a total area of 5,000 hectares is also being examined by the Ministry of the Environment and Public Works."

2) The refilling of the lake of Carla has already been included in the Second Community Support Plan, from which an area of around 18,500 hectares in the district between Volos and Larisa will be irrigable (Appendix A paragraph 5.8.2.), and

3) The construction of the dam at Palioderli is being pushed forward, with which another 7,000 hectares will be irrigated. A series of smaller dams is also foreseen, such as those of Gyrtoni, Amygdalia and Terpsithea, which will serve 12,500 hectares, but also of Titanos, with another 2,000 hectares etc. (Appendix A! Table 5.8.-1)

In a few words one could say that the problem of Thessaly is fictitious since 53% of the area is already irrigated compared with 33% at a national level, while the proportion to be irrigated by the foreseen works, without the diversion, will put the proportion at 70%. The problem appears only when some demand an irrigation proportion of 100%, something which is by all accounts completely unattainable. (See 7).

4) The Morgan Grenfell Study of 1988. Paragraph B 5.3. The total annual flow for the five river basins, including the resources of underground water, is estimated at 3,253 million cubic metres and is shared as appears below.
 

Note: The SEI of the diversion of the Acheloos includes three appendices A, B, and C, and the main study itself, from which the data of this study were taken.

III) The consultants, in the way they present their data, resemble the thief of mythology Procroustes, who cut or stretched the bodies of those he robbed so that they would fit his bed.

The consultants indeed, just like Procroustes, when they wish to present the irrigated area of Thessaly as small, as when they compare it with the irrigated areas of Aetoloacarnania (see 5), talk about only 167 thousand hectares as irrigated, that is 53 % of the total cultivable land, whereas when they want to make the needs and therefore the lack appear greater, so as to justify the completion of the diversion, they talk of 240 thousand hectares of irrigated land, that is 70% (see 6,7).

Comparable data.	Present situation	(A) No solution	(B) Diversion 0,6 billion c. m. per annum	(C) Diversion 1.1 billion c. m. per annum
Farmland	344,130	344,130	344,130	344,130
Irrigated	242,447.5	176,000	242,447.5	344,130
Dry	86,052.5	130,230	101,682.5	0
Fallow	13,500	37,930	0	0
Total	342,000	344,160	344,130	344,130
Proportion
Irrigated	70%	51%	70%	100 %
Dry	25 %	38%	30%	-
Total	95%	89%	100 %	100%

In column 5 (Solution C), irrigation of 100% is mentioned, which is the real final aim of all those who demand the diversion, even of those who apparently demand the "mild" diversion of 600 million c. m. of water. This is an unfeasible target, even for areas with a relative wealth of water, such as Aetoloacarnania.
 

IV) The consultants use the same method of Procroustes for estimating the irrigated area of Aetoloacarnania.

In just one two-page paragraph (paragraph 5.1. of appendix B!) we have three different sets of data concerning the irrigated and non-irrigated area of Aetoloacarnania. Thus in the paragraph, it is mentioned that "a proportion of about 43% of the farmland of Aetoloacarnania cannot be irrigated because of the nature of the ground." However, from table B of the same paragraph (See 8), 64% is mentioned as the irrigated area of Aetoloacarnania (1991). Thus we have a total of 107%. But it is not only that, as it is known that there is already a programme of extension of irrigation in Aetoloacarnania that will increase the irrigated area by 17,000 hectares, which means that the amount of 43% is completely out of reality. 56% is also mentioned as the irrigated area in the same paragraph in table (C), (See 9).

The people who decide the course of the project, and unfortunately they are neither the leaders of the Ministry, nor the people of Thessaly, think that they have found a way to outflank the strong objections to the project, both inside and outside Greece. This is the invention of the mild diversion, by which only 600 billion c. m. per annum will be diverted, instead of 1.1 billion of the full diversion, something which will have less diverse results on the environment.

The fact that has to pointed out most strongly is that the study gives no guarantee as to the certainty of the amount of the mild diversion of 600 million c. m. On the contrary, amounts of 650 and 700 million c. m. are referred to in the SEI, as in paragraph 10.1.1. and elsewhere in the main study."........ These areas where an average annual amount of 650 to 700 million c. m. of Acheloos water will be ...... ". No opportunity is ever lost in the SEI of emphasizing how the most useful diversion would be the full one of 1.1 billion, which is called solution C!

The amount of the mild diversion will be able to be increased whenever necessary for the sake of the needs of Thessaly, without any environmental limits being observed, as in so many other cases, e.g. in the case of the permanent flow below the dam of Stratos, where an environmentally sound water supply of 21 c. m. per second was foreseen by PEC, a project which has never been realised.

The fact that the amount of water from the diversion can be increased at any time is shown by the fact that the former studies for the diversion of 1.1 to 1.5 billion c. m. of water from Sykia foresaw a tunnel of length 17.5 kms and diametre 6 metres which would give this amount with an eight hour a day operation of the hydroelectric power station of Pefkophyto. Now, although the diversion is put at about half the previous amount, no lessening of the diametre of the tunnel is planned, which means that the planning is the same and the possibilities of the full diversion of the Acheloos at Sykia are the same too. The excuses offered by some people that there are no reservoir basins planned in Thessaly and so a larger diversion is unnecessary are childish, since such reservoirs can be built at any time in the future. All this shows quite clearly the ultimate aims of those responsible and their continuous attempts to mislead.
 

VI) With the diversion of 600 million c. m. and the non-building of irrigation systems, some 25% of the irrigation water will be lost.

The height of hypocrisy in the case of the Acheloos is that the programmed project foresees the diversion of such a large amount of water which, via the Peneios, will enter the Thermaic Gulf completely UNEXPLOITED!

Up to now there has been no planning in co-ordination with the diversion of overall construction of permanent land reclamation works in the Thessalian plain. The reclamation works which may be undertaken in the future will, because of cost, be the construction of makeshift irrigation canals which will have both the heaviest maintenance costs and the greatest water losses. As can be seen from the accompanying table (see 13) the losses in the case of a diversion of 600 billion c. m. without permanent installations comes to 395 million c. m. per annum, that is 25% of the total amount of water for irrigation (water needs with permanent works are 1204.6 million c. m., without permanent works 1599.2 million c. m.,).

So as to make it easier to understand how there will be such losses, which may be greater, we refer you only to the fact that the length of canals in the Karditsa region to irrigate 12,000 hectares from the dam on the Tauropos reach 887 kms. (Appendix B!, paragraph 2.1.) "..... the irrigation net- work of the Tauropos-Karditsa region, which covers an area of 12,000 hectares of farmland, is supplied with water from the dam of Tauropos and the summer flow of the Megdovas river. It is a complete network of clad canals of total length 887 kms......".
 

VII) The most important question is whether there will be benefits from the diversion, and what they will be. The answer is definitely negative, and can be shown from the data of both this study and of previous ones. The Thessalian plain after the diversion will become a problem operation which will be paid for by all the Greek people and no one will be able either to close it down or to sell it in the future.

 

A) Production of electricity

Until a short while ago, the officials of every sort, including those of the Ministry of the Economy, energetically highlighted the major power benefits from the diversion. They even reached the point of saying that the benefits of electrical power alone justified the diversion of the Acheloos.

Today the new SEI has come to put an and to all these lies. It refers to the matter with extraordinary frankness, saying clearly exactly what our organization had declared three years ago, that we will in fact have a reduction in electrical energy in comparison with a full exploitation of the natural course of the river.

In the main study there is a clear reference on page 2.9., "As far as the production of electrical energy is concerned, a reduction in the total produced power is expected in comparison with the zero alternative solution (the non diversion to Thessaly)". Despite this at many points the authors of the study lose no opportunities to try and point out that the energy losses are not so great, while they calmly hide the fact that the energy from the diversion is basic energy, which is cheap and not needed by PECP, in comparison with the energy produced by the HPS which is peak energy and is thus more expensive and valuable. In conclusion we would say that we not only have an amount loss from the diversion, but also an equally important quality loss. The greater energy produced without the diversion appears clearly in table 7.B.10.1. of the main study (see 10).

	Diversion from Sykia 0.6 billion c. m. per annum	Diversion from Sykia 0.6 billion c. m. per annum)	Diversion from Sykia 1.1 billion c. m.	Non-diversion
	Without Avlaki project (in present solution)	With Avlaki project	With Pyle and Mouzaki projects	Complete hydroelectric exploitation of Acheloos
Energy produced	2,634 (2,596)	2,858 (2,820)	3,089	3,147
Energy consumed by artesians	-250	-250	-50	-350
Saving of energyfrom Plasteras dam	+40	+40	+40	-
Total	2,424 (2,386) (1)	2,648 (2,610)	3,079	2,797

(1) The amount in brackets refers to a reduction by 10% of primary energy caused by the fact that energy from the Pefkophyto dam is available in summer.  

The benefits which come from the reduction in electrical energy from the closing of anti-economical artesian wells after the diversion is often emphasized in the study (see 10). This is not so true, because it is certain that new ones will be opened to replace those that will close after the diversion. At the same time, there is a cover-up in the SEI of the fact of an increase in consumption in electrical energy which will come form the need to operate large new pumping stations for the smooth supplying of the makeshift irrigation works which will be constructed. From tables (P 10-2) of appendix A of the study (see 14 and 15), a probable reduction in the consumption of energy from the closing down of artesians of 25.5 and 17.5 GWh annually is described, while there will be an increase in the consumption from the operation of the new pumping stations in the order of 30 and 24 GWh annually. Just from this one can understand that after the diversion we will have an increase in the consumption of energy by 11 GWh annually and not a reduction.
 

B) Income from agricultural production

In the case of the income which will originate from agricultural production, impressive financial figures are quoted, which however do not seem to have much relationship to reality. There are also serious mistakes in these data, something inexcusable both because of the seriousness of the project, and because the data come from the same office, that of the consultant Vakakis.

Specifically the Vakakis office, referring to the cultivation of soya, writes (Appendix B, paragraph 4.4.5.) that "The achieved average yield of soya in France and Italy is in the order of 3,000 kilos per hectare, while the average production in Greece is estimated at least 4,000 kilos per hectare in normal cultivation". There is no explaining of how in Greece production is 1,000 kilos per hectare greater. On the contrary, in table 14 at the end of appendix B, where there are data for agricultural income which will be created, with all the scenarios of diversion or non-diversion, there is reference to a production of 6,000 kilos from a diversion of 600 million c. m. and 6,500 kilos per hectare if the diversion is of 1.1 billion c. m. (See 16, 17 and 18)

The most important fact is that soya has been cultivated in seven areas of Thessaly over the last few years, and the average production per hectare is only 2,660 kilos. The best production, achieved in only one area, was 3,140 kilos (see 20). Indeed, with all these ambiguous data one wonders about the trustworthiness of this study and especially of appendix B from the Vakakis office.

As to the total income (net value from plant production) as set out in table A in paragraph 4.8.1. of appendix B (see 21), the Vakakis office gives the figure, in the case of the diversion of 600 million c. m. and in comparison with the existing situation, of about 73.5 billion drs. The increase in animal production is set at 26.6 million (from 22.8 to 49.4 billion), that is an increase of 116.56%, something which at once seems highly exaggerated. In conclusion we would say that the total gain (net value) of 100 billion drs from plant and animal production is very difficult to explain, and even more difficult when the consultant himself mentions that in the case of a diversion of 600 million c. m., we are not dealing with newly irrigated areas but improvement of already badly irrigated areas, with as a result much smaller financial benefits (see 7).

A complete analysis of the data is necessary here, so as to define the real size of the increase of added value (net profit) from the diversion project, as is shown in the data of tables 8, 14, 18, and the table of paragraph 4.8.1. Very important data will be found that come into complete opposition with the data and estimations of the Vakakis office.

In 1993, the amount of the net value from plant production in Thessaly amounted to 89,494,000,000 drs. The relative increase which will come from the diversion of 600 million c. m. will be, according to the estimates of the consultant, 162,973,000,000. This gives us a proportional increase of 82.1%. Such an increase only from plant production seems exaggerated for the following simple reasons.

From the comparison of the two tables of appendix B! (see 22), "Results of Agricultural Production in the Area of Irrigated land in Thessaly, Present Situation 1993" and (see 23), "Results of Agricultural Production of Aetoloacarnania. Ministry of Agriculture 1993", certain important conclusions can be made which lead to major queries.

From these two tables a selection of the 18 most important crops has been made, which represent 84.55% of the cultivated area of Aetoloacarnania and give 98.99% of the added value of plant production, while in Thessaly 96.24% of the cultivated area and 96.24% of the added value of plant production. With such proportions, it is obvious that the conclusions drawn will be completely representative.

It is well-known that Aetoloacarnania has plentiful irrigation water in its irrigated areas, even to the point of its being wasted, as the consultants themselves admit. The quality of the soil and the climatic conditions are much more favourable than those in Thessaly. With these facts in mind one would expect that the yield per hectare in Aetoloacarnania would be at least the same if not more than that of Thessaly. However comparison of the two tables shows exactly the opposite, that yields in Thessaly surpass those of Aetoloacarnania, and indeed often by 50% and even over 100% (see 11). Thus it is not logically possible to expect a further increase of yields in Thessaly with any form of diversion.

If indeed we have a greater production in Thessaly, it shows at least a satisfactory level of sufficiency of irrigation water, and any claims to the contrary are questionable. Thus an increase in irrigation water naturally will not cause a further increase in production as it is already near its maximum possible level. Another thought, which should not be considered so unlikely, is that these yields are falsified and are shown thus boosted for various reasons, in which case the authorities should seek an answer to the phenomenon.

Thus with the diversion of the Acheloos, the tremendous income proclaimed by the consultants is highly unlikely to exist, since no further increase in yield per hectare is possible, while there will also be no gain from restructuring of cultivation, since if it had been easy, it would have been done many years ago without the diversion.

In its attempts to impress, the Vakakis office often puts forward the extremely adverse effects in the case of the diversion not being made. The non-diversion accompanied by a complete lack of other works in Thessaly is the so-called scenario of the non-solution (solution A). Such a solution would indeed have very adverse consequences, coming form the dwindling of production, employment and income in Thessaly. However this non-solution is a theoretical figment, a malicious and utterly groundless and anti-scientific scenario, since there is absolutely no chance of such an eventuality.

At the same time, the same consultant systematically and consistently avoids referring to solution D which is the situation which will be created by the completion of all the irrigation works which utilize the waters of Thessaly without the diversion. It is known that this solution is already under way. It is known that the dam of Smokovo is complete, the re-filling of the lake of Carla has been included in the Second Community Support Plan, and that the dam of Palioderli will be started soon. A large number of other projects are also under way and others will be started in the future. The fact that none of these works is referred to is just another example of the partiality and the attempts to mislead and misinform.
 

VIII) The cost of the irrigated water is an important financial factor

At this point we cite table 4.9.5. (see 12) without comment. It refers to the cost of the water of the diversion, and we also inform you of the present cost (1993) for the farmer, which is 10,000 drs per hectare.