The task of the diversion of the Acheloos is not only a Greek but also a European task due to the size of the economical, developmental, technical, ecological and social factors involved. If ever completed, it will have grave consequences for the national economy, the environment, the development but also the social cohesion of the country, as we will prove with the data that follow.
 

I. The Causes of the Lack of Water in Thessaly

For decades the work of draining lakes went on in Thessaly without moderation. Thus lakes such as Nezeros, Xynias, Nessonida, Karla and many marshy areas were drained with the double excuse of obtaining more land for farmers but also of getting rid of malaria. Malaria may have been an acceptable excuse before the war, but can in no way be acceptable in the case of Karla which was drained in 1964.

These immoderate interventions caused the disappearance of large areas of surface water which would have been useful, not only for the irrigation of large areas but also for the enrichment of the subterranean water level with the result that where boring used to find water at 30 metres, now it is necessary to get to a great depth, up to 250 metres for water to be found. At the same time cases of extreme weather conditions have increased.

Especially as far as the draining of Karla is concerned, an area of 8,500 to 10,000 hectares, we must point out that although studies suggested the conservation of a considerable part, finally the solution of complete drainage was decided on with the result that the most important hygrobiotope in Europe after the Danube delta was completely lost, together with a considerable fish production (a thousand tons annually, employing 1,300 fishermen), while at the same time the climate of the area became extreme and the whole hydrological potential of the Thessalian plain was altered to the worse. Although there are now plans for a partial refilling by closing the drainage tunnel, this does not proceed for what are probably reasons of political cost.
 

II. There are Alternative Solutions for Thessaly

The expensive plans of the Swiss company Electro-Watt in 1968 and of the Canadian SNC in 1970 both came to the conclusion that the diversion of the Acheloos was uneconomical and suggested the exploitation of the waters of the Peneios and its tributaries with other local water reserves (Lake Karla etc.).
 

III. Developmental Targets of the Project

We would say that the philosophy of the project is the widening of local inequalities in the country since it intends to develop an already for Greek standards developed part of the country, Thessaly, and the further downgrading of an already underdeveloped part of the country, Aetoloacarnania. A comparison of the two areas follows.
 

1. East Greece (Thessaly)

1) An excellent road system.
2) A good railway network.
3) A good gas network.
4) The largest mercantile harbours (Peiraeus, Volos, Thessaloniki etc.)
5) Heavy industry.
6) 53% of the plain of Thessaly is already irrigated (33% of the total of the country).
7) One of the highest incomes per person.
8) Continual population increase during all the after war period due to economical possibilities.
 

2. West Greece (Aetoloacarnania)

1) Bad road system, furthermore unconnected with the rest of Greece (non-building of the Rion-Antirrion bridge, non-completion of the Egnatia highway and the Arta-Trikala road, non-reconstruction of the Agrinion- Karpenisi road.).
2) Abolition of unique railway line Agrinion- Kryoneri, when the Italians had already planned its expansion to Epirus and Albania 50 years ago.
3) Non-existent trade in harbours with the exceptions of Patra and Igoumenitsa.
4) Complete absence of heavy industry, while what does exist in Patra is rapidly being closed down (paper industry of Ladopoulos, Peiraiki-Patraiki, Pirelli etc).
5) 50-60% of Aetoloacarnania is irrigated, fortunately since agriculture contributes with 45% of the average income (22% in Thessaly).
6) Average income in Aetoloacarnania 78% of the national average income.
7) Continual fall in the population of the prefecture with the exception of the census of 1991 which showed a minimal increase.

In fact the project has the target of increasing the irrigated area in Thessaly to 90% of cultivated areas, which is unattainable even with the greatest diversion of 1.5 billion cubic metres annually, while Aetoloacarnania will be completely unable on the one hand to increase its own irrigated areas, something which is easy now as they are near the Acheloos and there is already such a programme for 17,000 hectares in the first phase, on the other hand to adapt its farming to new products as happened recently with the replacement of the eastern tobaccos, which demand only limited watering, with Virginia tobaccos, which have great demands of water.
 

IV. Studies and Cost of the Project

According to the financial and technical study of Morgan-Grenfell the final cost of the project would be 986 billion drachmae, but with the estimated inflation rates of at least the three year period 1990-1992 at half of the actual ones (Morgan-Grenfell, chapter E.1.2). Thus an article in the Economist (Jan. 1992), which raised the total cost to 1.3 trillion drachmae or 6.5 billion dollars (200 dr. = 1 dollar), is much nearer the truth. It is also well-known that such works in Greece cost 3-6 times as much. The huge economical cost, apart from the ecological, as the whole ecological balance of central Greece will be disrupted, make it impossible for this project to proceed with improvisations; but in fact it does proceed without any serious complete economical and environmental study, which will thus have tremendous consequences for many generations of Greeks.
 

V. Production of Electrical Energy

At this point an organised confusion has been created and some insist on an increase in electrical production after the diversion. In fact if the major diversion the Thessalians want (1.5 billion c.m. annually) is realised, then the hydroelectric power stations of Sykia and Avlaki on the course of the river will not be built.

With the construction of the Hydroelectric Power Stations of Pevkophyto, Mouzaki and Mavromati in Thessaly, there will indeed be power of 140 MW, but also a reduction of 231 GWH per year (chart 1). This loss of electrical energy is translated into a financial loss of about 4.5 billion drachmae a year for PEC (22.5 million dollars) according to the figures of the Ministry of National Economy. We must also keep in mind that in the case of the diversion, the accompanying works (dams, tunnels etc.) will cost 70 billion drs. more than in the case of non-diversion and exploitation of the water along its course. Finally it is also known that the manager of PEC, Mr Xanthopoulos, in a letter to the Ministry of National Economy asked for 139 billion for the losses the PEC will sustain from the diversion.
 

VI. Estimated Gains from the Diversion

The Ministry of National Economy has announced the following profits from the diversion:
1) 9 billion Drs from water for industrial and domestic purposes.
2) 10 billion Drs from electrical energy.
3) 150 billion Drs from agricultural production.

In the first case the sum of 9 billion for 80 million cubic metres of water for industrial and domestic use is exaggerated as the water would then be sold at 112.5 Drs a cubic metre. According to law 1739 / 1987, local authorities have the right to demand only a symbolic price, or even free supply in special cases, for water for domestic and other purposes. So all together, the amount would come to very little.

In the second case we have already presented data which prove that not only will there be no increase in energy, but indeed a loss of 231 million KWH per year. The final cost to the PEC will be more than 5 million Drs as cheap basic energy will be produced and not expensive peak energy.

The profits from agricultural production have been so overestimated as to seem now purely imaginary, and this is because the maximum of divertable water is 1.5 million c.m per year ( so much was measured at Sykia in the period 1950-1984.) However a reasonable amount according to up-to-date hydrological counts show that not more than 1 billion c.m can be counted on. Thus only 130,000 hectares can be irrigated, because there will also be major losses both from the dams themselves, but also through evaporation from the lakes and miles of canals (see chart 8). We must also keep in mind that quite a large part of this area is already irrigated by artesian water.

With the irrigation of even 150,000 hectares, there would have to be a clear production of at least 700,000 drachmae per hectare more than the existing production to reach the estimate of 150 billion, even with the supposed and unsure increase of livestock. Such profitable cultivations are extremely rare and in limited areas. The main products for cultivation in Thessaly after the diversion, according to the financial-technical study Morgan-Grenfell, are cotton, beet, maize, clover etc., that is, products already cultivated there and whose profits range from 100-200,000 Drs per hectare (see chart 9). If there were magical solutions for such increases in production the Thessalians would already have been using them on the 200,000 hectares irrigated now for many years.

One must also keep in mind the very high cost of water for irrigation due to the extremely high costs of maintaining such a network (5,000 workers and technicians, 30 billion Drs per year according to Morgan-Grenfell, chapter D 1.2 and chapter D 5.2.3).
 

VII. The Great Question Mark

Will all the water of the Acheloos be used for the irrigation needs of Thessaly, Yes or No?

If the answer is Yes and all the water goes for irrigation then all the new Hydroelectric Power Stations will operate like Tauropos (see chart 6) only in the irrigation period of May to September. This will mean the vast losses of the PEC from the loss of peak energy during the summer, but also the loss of all energy as the lakes will be used purely for storing in the winter.

Thus all those who talk about an increase in energy are surely tricking everyone as we will not only have a drop in production of energy, but also a dramatic drop in its quality.

If the answer is No and the water is used by the PEC on only energy considerations, half the water of the diversion (500 million c.m) will be lost during the production of winter energy, and only the other half will be used for irrigation and energy in summer.

This is most important, as half the water means half the irrigated area and therefore only half the increase in agricultural production that various " experts " have been telling us.
 

VIII. Rainfall in Western Greece

A very important factor that has not been taken into account in the various studies is the continual drop in rainfall in Greece in recent years. According to data of the National Meteorological Service, western Greece shows a reduction in rainfall in the order of 23-29% over the last 30 years (newspaper " Vima ", 27th May 1990, D. Papaioannou). Other newspaper articles which are supported by reality speak of an extended warm dry period with a considerable drop in rainfall and surface and underground waters.
 

IX. Amount of Water in the Acheloos

All studies up to now have depended on counts made in the period 1950-84. These show a flow in the order of 5 billion c.m. per year. More recent data however as of the seven year period 1985-91 gathered at the Hydroelectric Power Station of Kastraki show a flow of some 38% less in the order of 3.06 billion c.m annually (document of PEC 12617/12-5-92 to the Ministry of Industry). with further tendency downwards. During the three years 1989-91 it has already been further reduced to 2.5 billion c.m. per year (chart 3).
 

X. The Dehydration of Western Greece

After the diversion of the Mornos 20 years ago, now the diversion of the Euenos proceeds at a fast rate. Although the diversion of the first river had relatively little influence on the surrounding ecosystem, it is not the same with the case of the Euenos. According to a representative of the Foundation of Geological and Ore Research, Mr Smyrniotis, (discussion at Mesolongi, 8-2-1992) this river influences the springs of Naupactos as well as to an unknown extent the sources of Lake Trichonis.

Because of this diversion the lake will be affected to an extent that cannot be determined. It would however be dangerous with chain results, as its waters are used not only for the water supply of lakeside communities but also for the irrigation of considerable areas. We must also point to its great natural beauty and the possibilities of major tourist development in the future. There is already a plan in existence to take water from the Acheloos to the Euenos for Athens, to such a point where one wonders if there will be any water left for Aetoloacarnania.
 

XI. Environmental Results

If the studies already speak of unfavourable results of the diversion to the delta of the river with the amounts of water much greater than they really are, one can imagine the complete destruction of the whole ecosystem of the hygrobiotope as well as the lagoon of Mesolongi which, through a complete lack of fresh water during the summer months and the great evaporation in the same period, will turn into a vast salt-basin.

No measure for the saving of these areas is taken, since there is no mention of at least a safety minimum of water all year for the maintaining of the ecological balance, something which is however foreseen by law 1739 / 1987 (article 11, paragraphs 1, 6 & 7) and here ignored completely.

Important sources of the delta, such as Lambra, from which 1,800 hectares are irrigated, will lose most if not all of their water (as mentioned in the Study of Environmental Repercussions on the Delta of the Acheloos), while the sea water will seep to an unestimable degree into the cultivated and very fertile areas of Lesini, Katochi and Neochori making them unsuitable for cultivation. One can easily understand the meaning for the Bay of Patras what the loss of the clean water of the Mornos, then the Euenos and finally the Acheloos will mean.

It is not only the hygrobiotope of the delta of the Acheloos which is not taken into consideration, but also the areas of the Upper Acheloos in the Pindos, where the striking case of the community of Mesochora, which could have been saved with a reduction to the height of the dam by just 30 metres without any loss of power (S. Mayeirias, newspaper " Kathimerini ", 22-12-91), was abandoned in a criminal way to complete destruction and at a great cost to the PEC for recompensations.

Here one should mention the actual Environmental Repercussion Studies which seem to have just one purpose, since their scientific value is cast into doubt, that is that each government can say that the studies defined by law have been made, and that now they can continue with the work of destruction, legally and unpunishably, of the natural sources and environment of the country.
 

XII. What the Future Holds

With the new final amount of water of 3 billion m3. (only 2.5 billion m3. during last three years), on the one hand the desired irrigation of 150,000 hectares in Thessaly becomes problematic, on the other hand the irrigation of Aetoloacarnania will be adversely affected.

The limited storing capacities of the artificial lakes, which get less every year through the large amounts of sediment, are not able to regulate anything beyond a period of a few months time. The effective duration of the new lakes created by the diversion is limited as those of Mesochora and Pyle will be filled in 50 years, and that of Sykia in 150.

In such conditions, only a short drought would be enough to cause social conflict between the two parts of the country over their claims for sufficient water, and inevitably the social cohesion and peace of the country will be seriously affected.

XIII. Mistaken Data and Estimations